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BOOK REVIEW
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW. By Wayne R. LaFave
& Austin W. Scott, Jr. West Publishing Co.: 1972.
With a style of refreshing candor and a rare skill in marshall-
ing resources, this treatise' is an invaluable supplement to the bas-
ic course on substantive criminal law. The goal of this work is not
to delineate all Anglo-American crimes but to provide an insight
into the disparate elements and influences that have shaped mod-
em criminal law. Due to Supreme Court decisions such as Gid-
eon 2 and Argersinger, a greater number of law students will en-
gage in criminal representation than heretofore, and because of
the increasing body of regulatory crimes in the consumer protec-
tion and environmental law fields, the authors appropriately choose
a general approach to substantive criminal law rather than the
traditional segmented review of crimes.
Broad areas of substantive criminal law are examined, in-
cluding the goals of criminal law, the sources of authority and
limits on criminal jurisdiction, and the elements of a criminal act.
Using cases and statutes to illustrate relevant legal principles, the
text promotes a deductive approach. In contrast to the typical
textual pattern of cases surrounded by some editorial com-
ment, the competing theories are discussed with the supporting
authorities cited or summarized in the margin. In this manner
the authors achieve an integrated set of materials, each chapter
forming the basis for the next.
Realizing the "undue preoccupation" with appellate court
decisions and common law crimes in the first year of law school,
the authors attempt to rectify this imbalance with frequent refer-
ences to legislative contributions and limitations. There are also
provocative forays into such developing fields as discretionary en-
forcement.4 Furthermore, to the probable endearment of their
1. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972) [herein-
after cited as HANDBOOK].
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See Portman, Gideon's
Trumpet Blows jor Misdemeanants-Argersinger v. Hamlin, The Decision and Its
Impact, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1 (1973).
4. In contrast to the rigidity of substantive criminal law, the procedural
side of the administration of the criminal justice system is replete with situa-
tions in which the exercise of discretion determines what happens to an of-
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
readers, the authors avoid the use of the Socratic method. In-
stead, they offer the relevant, competing legal or policy consid-
erations, and, where appropriate, express their opinions on issues
in dispute between jurisdictions. For example, in discussing the
question of whether a defendant is guilty of murder if he is not
aware of the risk created by his conduct, the view of the English
judge and criminal law historian Stephen is contrasted with that
of Justice Holmes. Because of the severe penal consequences of a
murder conviction, the authors express their preference for Ste-
phen's requirement of the defendant's subjective realization to
the reasonable man standard posited by Justice Holmes.5
In an interesting exploration of the relationship between
criminal law and civil law, particular attention is focused on the
interplay between criminal law and its civil counterpart, the law
of torts.6 The aim of the criminal law, as the authors see it, is to
protect the public against harm, while the function of tort law is
to compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suf-
fered. Despite the different purposes, the laws frequently over-
lap. For example, some crimes utilize the idea of "proximate
cause", an important tort concept in liability for negligence; and,
liability for failure to act where there is a duty to act may be
criminal as well as tortious. Indeed, this interweaving of criminal
and tort law suggests the potentially ominous expansion of the
criminal process beyond dealing with purely antisocial behavior
to regulating all forms of human conduct.
The textual materials pose the question of whether it is use-
ful, in terms of general deterrence, to punish an individual for
conduct which creates an unintentional risk. The authors prop-
erly criticize legislation which defines criminal standards which
are virtually indistinguishable from those of tort law. The authors
suggest that the carefully defined terms of the Model Penal Code
provide a solution. Notwithstanding the greater clarity and pre-
cision of the Code's definition of recklessness7 and negligence,8
fender. For example, a prosecutor may decide certain offenders should not be
prosecuted, or juries will sometimes refuse to convict persons proven guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 18.
5. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 70.
6. Id. §§ 30-33.
7. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(C) (1967), defines "recklessness"
in this manner:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that considering the nature
and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion.
8. Criminal negligence is defined by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)
[Vol. 14
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the Code's distinction between a criminal and tortious act is not
altogether satisfactory.
The application of such tort concepts as strict liability and
vicarious liability to the criminal law offends the basic common
law traditions of criminal justice. In order to counter statutes
which impose criminal liability on a third party (usually an em-
ployer) for the acts committed by another and without his knowl-
edge, the authors propose that the desirable social goals (protec-
tion of consumers, employees and the environment) can be achieved
by utilizing the Model Code's characterization of the act as an
"offense" and penalizing by fine rather than legal disability.9
When the criminal process is utilized to arrest and detain
a drunk and there is no intention to seek a conviction,' ° the tradi-
tional purpose of criminal law takes on a new character. Pres-
ently, there are efforts to employ within the criminal process "pro-
tective custody" programs wherein the purpose is not to punish
the offender for wrongs committed against society, but to treat
the individual in order to prevent his own destruction. Similar-
ly, drug users are often provided with deferred sentences if they
will enter diversionary treatment programs. 1 As the criminal proc-
ess develops this perspective of protecting the individual, its
scope is enlarged beyond the traditional task of protecting the
public from harm. One may properly question whether the crimi-
nal process should be utilized as a means of regulating life-
styles, not necessarily harmful to society, especially in view of
our historical concern for individual freedom and civil liberties.
In chapter 3, entitled "Basic Premises of the Criminal Law",
society's right to control antisocial behavior is tempered by classify-
ing what constitutes offensive individual conduct. In the course of
defining the specific elements of criminal conduct the question arises
as to the limits of criminal sanctions. Those who argue against
imposing sanctions for "victimless crimes" would decriminalize
purely private conduct, such as acts involving the use of narcotics
or consensual sexual behavior. Others insist that society must have
the right to regulate morality and to define as criminal conduct
(d) (1962):
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to per-
ceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the cir-
cumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the stand-
ard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (1962).
10. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 849 (West 1970).
11. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1000-1000.4 (West Supp. 1973).
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which tends to imperil the existence of society.
In dealing with the relationship of procedural to substantive
law, the authors characterize the former as essentially softening
or humanizing the latter. Substantive law, with its strict defini-
tions and mandatory penalties, is less flexible than procedural law,
with its inherent opportunities for discretion. It is only in the
exercise of this discretion in the successive procedural phases of
arrest, arraignment, conviction and sentencing that the otherwise
absolute legal definitions can be applied in such a way as to meet
the practicalities of everyday situations. One such flexibility de-
vice is plea bargaining. While calling for an end to this device,
the National Conference on Criminal Justice, funded by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), at its January
1973 session, failed to suggest an alternative which might com-
pensate for "the inability of the legislature to envisage all the
day-to-day situations.' 12
Presumably, the authors regard post conviction procedures
and plea bargaining as well as punishment and treatment as not
within the ambit of substantive criminal law. In any event, their
decision to omit these topics is consistent with the traditional atti-
tude of the Bar. Despite the fact that nationally approximately
80-85% of all defendants plead guilty and as many as 80% of the
remainder are found guilty, the authors give scant attention to
the defense counsel's responsibility after adjudication. It is un-
fortunate that the treatise did not present the substantive law and
its underlying principles from the perspective of plea bargaining,
since this device is employed in every jurisdiction in the United
States.
That the authors' treatment of criminal rehabilitation is
somewhat superficial is illustrated by their suggestion that the
number of habitual criminals may be exaggerated. Although
this reviewer joins in the skepticism that "habitual offenders" can
be so classified with any certainty, the authors' theory is at best
doubtful and appears to have been rejected by the pronouncements
of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who noted that because only a
fraction of those who leave custody and commit crimes are de-
tected, the recidivism rate is actually higher than official arrest
reports would indicate.'8
The authors deal only in passing with the issue of the right
to treatment. In discussing the question of insanity and the sev-
12. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 19.




eral phases of adjudication where this issue may be raised (pre-
trial, trial and disposition), the authors barely touch on the defen-
dant's right to treatment as contrasted to the state's right to con-
fine. 14 This is not only an issue in cases where competency is in
question, but in all cases where a defendant is incarcerated. The
adversary system requires the lawyer to receive proper training
regarding his prospective client's right to treatment. The alterna-
tive is to abdicate full responsibility to other professions at a time
when increased appropriations are being applied to corrections
and no profession has demonstrated any significant degree of ex-
pertise in this field. It must be recognized that even if the con-
victed defendant (or, for that matter, the defendant who waives
his procedural and substantive rights in exchange for a "diver-
sionary treatment program") is placed in the best-intentioned
rehabilitation program, he may continue to need legal representa-
tion.
In the chapter entitled "Sources and General Limitations",
the authors deal with the critical relationship between legislation
and substantive due process. Litigators, judges, and legislators
have been troubled by legislatively-created conclusive presump-
tions and affirmative defenses on the one hand and judicial en-
forcement of such traditions as separation of powers and guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt on the other. The authors explore the
tension between the court and the legislature in this area and re-
gard Leary v. United States'5 as providing the standard to be ap-
plied in determining the legitimacy of a statutory presumption.
The test in Leary is that a statutory presumption is immaterial
"unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend."' 6
In the chapter on "responsibility" the authors expose a weak-
ness in the law in their discussion of the defense of diminished
capacity.' 7 If a defendant is acquitted based upon a defense of
insanity, the end result is usually some form of commitment; al-
though the jury on occasion may direct the release of the defen-
dant if it finds that his mental condition no longer exists and the
defendant is not a danger to society. However, if the defendant is
acquitted pursuant to a defense of diminished capacity or lack of
sufficient intent and is not found guilty of a lesser included of-
fense (where intent need not be proved or can be satisfied by a
lower standard), there is no automatic mental commitment.
14. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 41.
15. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
16. Id. at 36.
17. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 42.
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Therefore, the defendant who is unable to satisfy the requirements
of criminal insanity, but can show diminished capacity, can ob-
tain absolute acquittal, but the defendant who successfully proves
his criminal insanity will typically be confined to a state mental
institution. In an attempt to remedy this anomaly, revisions to
the California Penal Code have been proposed i8 which would sub-ject a defendant acquitted under a diminished capacity defense
to a commitment similar to a civil commitment under the Lanter-
man-Petris-Short Act.'"
In the chapter "Justification and Excuse", there is an ex-
tended discussion of the defense of duress. This defense, recog-
nized at common law and adopted by statute in California,2 ° is
unavailable as a defense to a charge of murder. This contrasts
to the Model Penal Code, 2' which would allow the defense in
murder cases when the threat to the defendant was one which a
reasonable man could not resist.
The use of force in the defense of property is another topic
of current concern. 2  While most modem authorities authorize
the use of deadly force in defense of one's dwelling, there is in-
creasing support for the rule that before the occupant can use
deadly force, he must reasonably believe that the intruder in-
tends to commit a felony and to threaten the occupants of the
dwelling with violence. 23
The authors' artistry in the arrangement of their materials is
illustrated by their discussion of "felony-murder". By virtue of
previous analyses of such concepts as criminal intent, causation
and self-defense, the reader is in a position to evaluate the argu-
ment that the felony-murder doctrine be abandoned. 4 In their
discussion of this issue, optimum use is made of significant avail-
able resource materials including the Model Penal Code, the stat-
utory law of Ohio and Great Britain 21 and the incisiveness of
Justice Holmes.
The final two chapters demonstrate the relationship be-
tween common law and statutory law. Using illustrative discus-
sions of specific laws, the authors facilitate an evaluation of the
criminal process as a technique for social control.
18. Penal Code Revision Project Tentative Draft No. 2, at 92 (Report of the
Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, 1968).
19. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5000 et seq. (West 1972).
20. CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (West 1970).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962).
22. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 55.
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii) (1962).
24. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 71. Cf. Comment, Taming the Felony-
Murder Rule, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 97 (1973).
25. Both of these jurisdictions have, in effect, eliminated felony-murder as
a substitute for intent to kill.
[Vol. 14
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Unlike most texts on criminal law, this treatise enables the
reader to sense the evolution of Anglo-American law and the in-
teraction between social developments and the common and statu-
tory law. The authors appreciate the law's response to changing
social concerns and by sharing this appreciation with us allow the
student a glimpse of modem criminal law beyond that offered by
traditional case books.
Phillip H. Ginsberg*
* Chief Attorney, Seattle-King County Public Defender; B.A., Princeton
University, 1961; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1964; member Washington State
Bar; National Legal Aid & Defender Association-Board of Directors, Execu-
tive Committee (1972-1973).
